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Neural processing faces three rather different, and perniciously tied, communication problems. First, compu-
tation is radically distributed, yet point-to-point interconnections are limited. Second, the bulk of these
connections are semantically uniform, lacking differentiation at their targets that could tag particular sorts
of information. Third, the brain’s structure is relatively fixed, and yet different sorts of input, forms of process-
ing, and rules for determining the output are appropriate under different, and possibly rapidly changing,
conditions. Neuromodulators address these problems by their multifarious and broad distribution, by enjoy-
ing specialized receptor types in partially specific anatomical arrangements, and by their ability to mold the
activity and sensitivity of neurons and the strength and plasticity of their synapses. Here, I offer a computa-
tionally focused review of algorithmic and implementational motifs associated with neuromodulators, using
decision making in the face of uncertainty as a running example.Introduction
Who talks to whom, what they are allowed to say, and how the
answers to these questions can change, are central to the design
and operation of distributed computing systems. Brains adopt
distributed computation to a prodigious degree and thus face
critical issues with each of them. The problem with ‘‘who talks
to whom’’ is that some sorts of information need to be broadcast
rather widely, since they can affect many aspects of ongoing
computations. However, the number of synapses made is
severely limited compared with the number of possible targets.
Unlike networks such as the internet, there is of course no oppor-
tunity for packets of information to be routed indirectly.
The problem with ‘‘what they are allowed to say’’ is that the
preponderant forms of synaptic communication are severely
restricted. For instance, short of architectural specializations or
complex neural activity codes, postsynaptic cells cannot distin-
guish separate sorts of presynaptic activation or inhibition, even
though different sorts of information need to have radically
different effects. Equivalently, different inputs lack intrinsic tags
to their sources. This is particularly important for signals that
are broadcast in order to address the problems of distribution.
Of course, there are many architectural specializations but this
does not preclude other, more direct, solutions.
The issue raised by the question of ‘‘how the answers. can
change,’’ is that anatomy is relatively stable, and yet different
conditions can require dynamics or information integration that
may need to change in characteristic ways to short order. For
instance, the collective behavior of neurons comprising central
pattern generators involved in creating rhythmic motion needs
to alter in the light of different environmental challenges; equally,
the strengths of different sources of data bearing on a sensory
processing problem should optimally adjust with the relative reli-
abilities of those data. How can structurally fixed networks be
endowed with the substantial degree of context dependence
that seems to be required?240 Neuron 76, October 4, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.The organization and effects of neuromodulators, at least
under a suitably catholic construal (including monoamines, ace-
tylcholine, peptides, steroids, hormones, gases such as nitric
oxide, and even conventional neurotransmitters such as gluta-
mate in some of their modes of operation), appear to offer solu-
tions to all these concerns.
Neuromodulators can be broadly distributed via the blood-
stream, via volume transmission and diffusion from widespread
release sites such as synaptic varicosities (Agnati et al., 2006),
and via massive axonal arborizations having huge numbers of
release sites. There are also more selective indirect pathways.
Furthermore, neuromodulators luxuriate in a lush variety of
targets. For the issues here, key to their effects are membrane-
bound receptors. Such receptors can be highly specific for
different neuromodulators, providing the ‘‘tagging’’ discussed
above. As we will see, architectural and neuromodulatory spe-
cializations are frequently integrated. These observations jointly
address the questions of ‘‘who talks to whom’’ and ‘‘what they
are allowed to say.’’
Second, in terms of their effects, neuromodulators canmanip-
ulate neural processing over short and long timescales in many
ways. The medium of modulation includes directly hyperpolariz-
ing or depolarizing neurons, changing their responsivity to input,
altering the strengths of synapses, and shaping the plasticity of
those synapses. When integrated across a network of neurons,
this can lead to dramatically different dynamics and input-output
behavior. The influences can also interact—for instance, in Heb-
bian forms of long term potentiation and depression, plasticity is
partly determined by activity and can be affected by neuromodu-
lators both directly and indirectly through their effects on that
activity. Neuromodulatory effects are remarkably strong—as evi-
denced by the actions of drugs on the global dynamics and
processing of the brain. These are all ways bywhich neuromodu-
lators realize context dependence and so address the issues of
‘‘how answers... can change.’’
Table 1. Twenty-Five Lessons from Computational
Neuromodulation, in Two Broad Categories
Organization
# Content
A Neuromodulatory systems can report selective information.
B This report can be over a very quick timescale.
C This report can also be over multiple timescales, particularly
tonic and phasic.
D Via different affinities and time courses, different receptor types
can respond selectively to separate characteristics of the signal.
E Different receptor types can be localized on anatomically
different pathways.
G Autoreceptors play an important regulatory role.
H Interactions among different neuromodulators are very
widespread.
I Of these interactions, opponency is especially prevalent.
J Opponency is rarely simple or symmetric; but rather competition
and cooperation aremixed and effects are frequently asymmetric.
K There is a complex tapestry of structural heterogeneity
within each system.
P There are structured loops involving sensory and frontal
cortical areas and neuromodulatory nuclei.
Q There are limits to the structural and functional specificity
of the neuromodulators.
R Partially independent of the spiking of neuromodulatory neurons,
there is local, presumably glutamatergic, control over release.
X Neuromodulatory neurons can corelease other
neurotransmitters, notably glutamate.
Y Neuromodulators are vasoactive, affecting the interpretation
of results from fMRI.
Effects
# Content
F Neuromodulatory signals can be multiplexed—the same
information turned to different uses.
L Neuromodulators play a key role in regulating internally-
directed computations such as gated working memory.
M Neuromodulators can influence the course of activity by
regulating which of a number of gross pathways determine
the activity of neurons.
N Neuromodulators regulate the nature and structure
of oscillations.
O Neuromodulators affect plasticity over many time scales.
S Neuromodulators are involved in the regulation of energy
utilization in the brain and body.
T Many neuromodulators exhibit an inverted U-shaped (or Yerkes-
Dodson) curve relating concentration or release to effect.
U It takes significant time for changes in neuromodulatory activity
to be reported to target sites, potentially limiting their effects.
V Failures of neuromodulatory systems are tied to debilitating
neurological and psychiatric diseases; they are also major
therapeutic targets.
W Individual differences in neuromodulatory receptors or
transporters have observable effects on decision-making
behavior.
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full justice in a short paper, and there are many excellent reviews
of numerous of its facets. In order to scrutinize how neuromodu-
lators solve the communication problems posed at the outset,
a single class of computations associated with decision making
in the face of uncertainty will be the focus. Neuromodulators are
deeply and revealingly involved in decision making, albeit with
many contentious issues remaining. I use decision making as
a backdrop to highlight twenty-five general lessons from compu-
tational neuromodulation, as promised in the title (see Table 1).
Two main conceptual components of decision making are
utility and uncertainty. Subjects should make choices by en-
gaging in a form of planning to assess the expected long-run
utility of possible actions based on a characterization of the
current circumstance and then choose accordingly (note the
term ‘‘circumstance’’ is used to refer to the detailed aspects of
the current and past sensory environment that suffice to deter-
mine as best as possible the future effects of the subject’s
current choice). However, uncertainty permeates both the deter-
mination of the current circumstance, for instance because of
sensory noise, and the evaluation of the utility of actions, for
instance because of ignorance stemming from incomplete
learning. As we will see, multiple, partially independent, systems
are involved in the overall processes of choice and are thus tied
up with utility and uncertainty, and all the systems are influenced
by neuromodulators.
Our restriction to decision making leads to a concentration on
the four major ascending neuromodulators: acetylcholine (ACh),
dopamine (DA), norepinephrine (NE), and serotonin (5-HT). Even
just for these four, there is not the space to discuss many of their
operations or to provide the mathematical details of the models
that underlie the analysis (as described in detail in the cited
papers). The focus will be on data from rodents and primates,
although there is substantial commonality of neuromodulator
effects (if not always their identities) in invertebrates (Katz,
2011). This analysis is influenced by Doya (2002) and the contri-
butions in Doya et al. (2002). It is important to note that almost
none of the computationally richer cases discussed is yet univer-
sally accepted.
Utility
Utility or affective value is a central piece of information that influ-
ences behavior. In terms of reinforcement learning (RL; Sutton
and Barto, 1998), predictions about future values are made
based on the current circumstance to determine choice and
action; and, at least when disconfirmed, command learning.
Utility should be influenced by aspects of a subject’s motiva-
tional state—the prospect of food is more valuable to a hungry
than a thirsty animal. When choices can (perhaps also) avoid
punishments, it is net utility that counts—it may not be worth
stopping to collect either outcome in the face of mortal threat.
Utility also plays roles other than determining the suitability of
discrete choices. For instance, one can argue (Niv et al., 2007)
that the average rate of (positive) utility quantifies the effective
cost of the passage of time, in that the larger the expected
rate, themore costly it is to deny oneself that much utility through
failing to act for a given length of time. This can energize behavior
(Guitart-Masip et al., 2011).Neuron 76, October 4, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 241
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mation processing and raises all three communication problems
discussed above: very many areas of the brain need to know
about the utility of outcomes and predicted outcomes; the utili-
ties are affected by a variety of different factors for which segre-
gated informational channels would be ideal; and utilities can
have immediate effects on structurally fixed networks. We will
see that the involvement of neuromodulation in computations
to do with utility illuminates all these issues and also highlights
a number of other general properties.
One important complexity about utility is the parallel involve-
ment of two different instrumental systems and also Pavlovian
influences. These systems are subject to neuromodulation in
partially different ways, and so are discussed individually below.
The goal-directed, ormodel-based, instrumental system (Dickin-
son and Balleine, 2002), which involves frontal regions and the
dorsomedial striatum (Balleine, 2005; Valentin et al., 2007), is
believed to construct a model of the task and to use that model
prospectively to predict outcomes consequent on choices (Tol-
man, 1948). One central mark of goal-directed control is its
sensitivity to motivational state—predicted outcomes are evalu-
ated under current (or possibly predicted; Raby et al., 2007)
motivational states. The second instrumental control system is
habitual, or model free (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002), and is
more closely associated with a different set of regions that in-
cludes the dorsolateral striatum (Balleine, 2005; Tricomi et al.,
2009). This learns what to do from direct experience of past
actions and reward and so plans retrospectively (Thorndike,
1911). That planning is retrospective implies that it is the motiva-
tional state that pertained during learning that is important, and
so model-free actions may be inappropriate for the current moti-
vational state.
Finally, for instrumental systems, choices are ultimately con-
tingent on the delivery of suitable outcomes. Conversely, under
Pavlovian control, elicitation of preparatory and consummatory
actions associated with predictions of, or the actual presence
of, biologically significant reinforcers, appears to be automatic.
Evidence for this is that the actions are still elicited even if they
have deleterious consequences in terms of actually getting or
preventing good or bad outcomes (Williams and Williams,
1969; Hershberger, 1986; Dayan et al., 2006). One interpretation
is that Pavlovian actions are the result of evolutionary preprog-
ramming, providing heuristic choices that are typically, though
not always, appropriate. The predictions underlying Pavlovian
control may be made in model-based or model-free ways.
Appetitive and aversive utilities act in rather distinct ways,
a fact that is better understood for model-free control. Thus,
reward and punishment are considered separately in the latter.
Reward in Model-Free Instrumental and Pavlovian
Control
Dopamine is a key ascending neuromodulator. There is ample
evidence that the phasic activity of DA neurons and the phasic
release of DA in macaques (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Schultz
et al., 1997; Morris et al., 2006; Satoh et al., 2003; Nakahara
et al., 2004), rodents (Hyland et al., 2002; Roesch et al., 2007;
Garris et al., 1999; Gan et al., 2010), and even humans (Zaghloul
et al., 2009; Kishida et al., 2011) report a particular form of242 Neuron 76, October 4, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.so-called temporal difference prediction error (Sutton, 1988)
for long run future reward (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz
et al., 1997; Barto, 1995). Note that ‘‘reward’’ here is defined
as the sort of appetitive reinforcement that is objectively realized
in terms of causing actions leading to it to be repeated (Thorn-
dike, 1911) (i.e., ‘‘wanting,’’ as distinct from ‘‘liking’’ [Berridge,
2004], which is more opioid than dopaminergically sensitive [Pe-
cin˜a et al., 2006]). The prediction error arises whenever there is
an unexpected change in future reward, both positively (when
either a reward arrives that was not expected or a stimulus
arrives that was itself not expected but that predicts a future
reward) and negatively (e.g., when an expected reward is with-
held). The predictions are based on all aspects of the circum-
stances of the subject at the time they are made, but pertain to
sequences of future reward. Usually, distal rewards are dis-
counted, or downweighted in importance, compared with prox-
imal ones.
At least three roles have been postulated for this dopaminergi-
cally encoded prediction error. First, it should inspire learning to
make accurate predictions based on the current circumstance
and, depending on the precise interpretation, learning to choose
actions in that circumstance that lead to greater reward (Sutton
and Barto, 1998) or to avoid actions that lead to smaller reward.
Many regions of the brain are involved inmaking predictions; and
indeed DA can influence synaptic plasticity in various ways (see
Tritsch and Sabatini, 2012, this issue of Neuron).
The striatum is a particularly important target for dopaminergic
neuromodulation. One major anatomical feature of this structure
is the existence of separated direct and indirect pathways,
defined by their output targets. Neurons in the direct or ‘‘go’’
pathway are influenced largely by D1 dopamine receptors and
are involved in the initiation and inspiration of action. D1 recep-
tors have been suggested as being sensitive to phasic increases
in the concentration of dopamine consequence on bursts and
so boosting the future propensity to perform actions found to
have surprisingly good outcomes (Frank, 2005; Frank et al.,
2004; Frank and O’Reilly, 2006; Cohen and Frank, 2009; Kravitz
et al., 2012).
Conversely, neurons in the indirect or ‘‘no-go’’ pathway are
subject to D2 dopamine receptors and influence the inhibition
of action (Gerfen et al., 1990; Smith et al., 1998). Dopamine nor-
mally suppresses the indirect pathway via D2 receptors; D2
receptors are more sensitive to dopamine than D1 receptors
and so are more greatly affected by dips below baseline caused
when reward are worse than expected. Activity-controlled plas-
ticity would thus lead to a more intense or likely rejection of the
disadvantageous action (Frank, 2005; Frank et al., 2004; Frank
and O’Reilly, 2006; Cohen and Frank, 2009; Kravitz et al., 2012).
Temporal difference learning has the effect of transferring
phasic activity from the time of occurrence of an unexpected
reward to the time of occurrence of the earliest reliable predictor
of that reward, without changing its magnitude. Thus, the long
run average rate of the prediction error (which would be reflected
in more tonic concentrations of dopamine) is just the long run
average reward rate, which we argued above acts as an oppor-
tunity cost for the passage of time and determines measures of
the vigor of responding (Niv et al., 2007). A role for dopamine in
vigor is consistent with the effect of dopaminergic lesions on
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with Parkinson’s disease (characterized by the loss of dopamine
cells) to engage in effortful actions (Mazzoni et al., 2007), and
even theway that dopamine levels in various parts of the striatum
track changes in vigor induced by satiety (Ostlund et al., 2011). It
is known, though, that the phasic and tonic activity of dopamine
cells are at least partly separable (Grace, 1991; Goto and Grace,
2005), suggesting greater complexities in the relationship.
The third role for the phasic dopaminergic prediction error
signal that arises when a predictor of future reward is presented
is to liberate (or perhaps invigorate) Pavlovian responses associ-
ated with the prospect of reward (Panksepp, 1998; Ikemoto and
Panksepp, 1999). Such predictors lead to Pavlovian boosting of
instrumental responses (Satoh et al., 2003; Estes, 1943; Dickin-
son and Balleine, 2002; Nakamura and Hikosaka, 2006; Talmi
et al., 2008), a process believed to involve the action of dopa-
mine in the nucleus accumbens (Murschall and Hauber, 2006),
potentially via D1 receptors (Frank, 2005; Surmeier et al., 2007,
2010). The phasic dopamine signal consequent on predictive
cues provides a formal underpinning for the theory of incentive
salience (McClure et al., 2003; Berridge and Robinson, 1998),
which is concerned with motivational influences over the atten-
tion garnered by such stimuli.
A first group of the twenty-five general lessons about neuro-
modulation emerges from this focus on dopamine (Table 1, A–
Y). Perhaps the most important are that (A) neuromodulatory
neurons can report very selective information (i.e., reward pre-
diction errors for dopamine) on a (B) very quick timescale. To
put it another way, there is no reason why anatomical breadth
should automatically be coupled with either semantic or tem-
poral breadth. Nevertheless (C), neuromodulators can also
signal over more than one timescale, with at least partially sepa-
rable tonic and phasic activity, and different receptor types may
be sensitive to the different timescales; additionally (D) by having
different affinities (as do D1 and D2 receptors), different types
can respond selectively to separate characteristics of the signal
(Frank, 2005). Along with their different properties (E), different
receptor types can be localized on different pathways, and these
pathways are also potentially subject to modulation from a
variety of other systems, such as the local, tonically active inter-
neurons in the striatum that release ACh (Aosaki et al., 1994; Ao-
saki et al., 1995; Kaneko et al., 2000; Higley et al., 2009).
In addition (F), observe the multiplexing inherent in having a
neuromodulator report a signal (here a reward prediction error)
that has a variety of important, but distinct, functions, we will
see some further putative functions of this phasic dopamine
signal below. This can make interpretation very complicated—
particularly for experiments which manipulate dopamine or its
receptors systemically.
It is also known (G) that a key role is played by autoreceptors
that are typically inhibitory to the release of the neuromodulator
concerned, e.g., dopamine receptors on dopamine neurons
and their terminals. An obvious role for these is feedback con-
trol. However, this can pose a problem for interpretation—the
semantics of vigorous activity of dopamine in terms of a predic-
tion error would become contingent on the nature of the current
set point; it is also a confound for pharmacological investigation
and treatment. Autoinhibition is a way for tonic signaling to seta baseline for phasic signaling, an issue whose computational
implications have been explored a little both for reward (Daw
et al., 2002; Boureau and Dayan, 2011) and, as we discuss later,
uncertainty (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). There are other
forms of short term plasticity in the release of dopamine in
response to bursts, including facilitation as well as inhibition
(Montague et al., 2004).
The dopaminergic prediction error is generally considered to
be part of habitual and model-free Pavlovian systems, involved
in retrospective control. Onemight think that dopamine signaling
would therefore be insensitive to motivational state. However,
there are various ways in which sensitivity can be imported. First,
if the information about state forms part of the representation
of the stimulus, so state can be treated also as circumstance,
then regular learning that maps circumstances to predictions
will endow dopamine activity with state dependence. Second,
dopamine neurons themselves have receptors for neuromodula-
tors such as orexins (or hypocretins) (Siegel, 2004; Aston-Jones
et al., 2010). This would allow their activity to be directly sensitive
to motivational state. Indeed (H), interneuromodulatory interac-
tions, such as the influence of one set of neuromodulators on
others are very widespread (Briand et al., 2007). Third, structures
that drive dopamine activity might themselves be directly sensi-
tive to motivational state—for instance, it has been suggested
that the amygdala’s sensitivity to the neuromodulator oxytocin
will change its responding in the face of social threats or oppor-
tunities (De Dreu, 2012), and this could affect dopamine re-
sponding.
Punishment in Model-free Instrumental and Pavlovian
Control
Avoiding or minimizing punishment and threats is also of critical
importance, and the same considerations as for appetitive
outcomes might lead one to expect neuromodulators to play
a central role in learning in aversive conditions. One important
complexity is that animals have a very extensive repertoire of
species-specific defensive consummatory behaviors appro-
priate to the nature and imminence of frank threats, at least partly
realized in the sophisticated structure of areas such as the peri-
acqueductal gray (Bolles, 1970; McNaughton and Corr, 2004;
Keay and Bandler, 2001). This makes it hard to understand the
interplay between such inbuilt responses, Pavlovian preparatory
responses such as behavioral inhibition that are tied via predic-
tion (whose neuromodulatory basis is debated; McNally et al.,
2011) to initially neutral stimuli, and fully-fledged instrumental
responses in the light of aversion.
One long-standing and critical division is between passive and
active avoidance (Konorski, 1967). Although exact definitions
differ, passive avoidance involves not doing actions that lead
to punishment, whereas active avoidance requires emitting
specific responses to avoid deleterious outcomes. The absti-
nence in passive avoidance can be specific to particular, prob-
lematical, choices, or it can be general, as in behavioral inhibition
or certain forms of freezing. Conversely active avoidance in-
volves the emission of specific responses to obviate potential
punishment. A key idea here is so-called two-factor learning
(Mowrer, 1947) and safety signaling. This involves learning that
circumstances which could be associated with punishmentNeuron 76, October 4, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 243
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with removing the threat is appetitive. It can therefore reinforce
the action concerned, just as in the previous section.
To the extent that unexpected punishments are coded in the
inhibition of phasic dopamine responses below baseline (Ung-
less et al., 2004; Cohen et al., 2012), just like non-delivery of
expected reward (Schultz et al., 1997), the indirect pathway
through the striatum which is tonically inhibited by dopamine
via D2 receptors is well-placed to realize specific passive avoid-
ance (Frank et al., 2004). Indeed, selectively activating neurons in
just this pathway has recently been shown to lead to place and
action avoidance in spatial and operant paradigms (Kravitz
et al., 2012), exactly opposite to the effect of activating neurons
in the direct pathway.
However, suppression of phasic dopamine activity is not
the whole story for passive avoidance, since serotonergic neuro-
modulation has also been implicated in behavioral inhibition
(Gray and McNaughton, 2003; Crockett et al., 2009, 2012),
including in the face of punishment. Apparently more problem-
atic is the fact that dopamine neurons have been reported to
be phasically excited by punishments (Mirenowicz and Schultz,
1996; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010), albeit with evidence of the
particular involvement of those neurons whose cell bodies lie
in just one part of the dopamine system, the so-called mesocort-
ical region of the ventral tegmental area (VTA) which projects
to (pre)frontal cortex (Brischoux et al., 2009; Lammel et al.,
2008, 2011). Consideration of safety signaling in active avoid-
ance suggests a rationale for this activation, as arising from the
temporal difference prediction error signal that we discussed in
the context of reward. This error signal is based on differences
in the predicted values of successive circumstances (Johnson
et al., 2001; Moutoussis et al., 2008; Maia, 2010). Thus, dopa-
mine would be phasically activated by the incompletely ex-
pected attainment of safety, or the prediction of the prospects
of this. This would enable it to control learning of the appropriate
avoidance response, for instance in the direct pathway of the
striatum.
One might expect such predictions about future safety to be
sensitive to the controllability of the punishment. Unfortunately,
dopamine release (as measured by microdialysis) provides
a somewhat mixed picture. It is known that the release of dopa-
mine to aversive outcomes does not always persist in the face of
uncontrollable (and thus unavoidable) contingencies (Cabib and
Puglisi-Allegra, 2012; Cabib and Puglisi-Allegra, 1994; Puglisi-
Allegra et al., 1991); although this may differ in different target
regions (Bland et al., 2003a, 2003b), in particular with reports
of inescapable, but not escapable, shock increasing dopamine
levels in mPFC, at least during the provision of the punishment
(Bland et al., 2003a). Further, whereas rats from a strain favoring
active coping strategies show an increase in dopamine in medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in the face of stress, rats fromadifferent
strain that engages in more reactive or passive strategies, do not
(Giorgi et al., 2003). These finer grain details at least militate
against the suggestion based on the activation of dopamine
in both appetitive and aversive circumstances that it codes
primarily for salience (Redgrave et al., 1999; Horvitz, 2000),
although it has been suggested that this is true for some selected
groups of dopamine neurons (Lammel et al., 2011).244 Neuron 76, October 4, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.The next question becomes the mechanism for learning the
prediction about the possible future punishment that is ultimately
responsible for the safety signal. There is evidence that this does
not depend only on dopamine—for instance blocking D2 dopa-
mine receptors leaves learning about aversive contingencies
intact, only impairing the learning of the avoidance actions (Be-
ninger, 1983). One possibility is that one part of the system of
serotonergic neuromodulation plays the role of an opponent to
dopamine, being associated with aversive rather than appetitive
outcomes (Deakin, 1983). This claim is subject to a range of com-
plexities and contention (discussed at length in Cools et al.,
2011; Boureau and Dayan, 2011).
In the scheme of safety signaling, the idea would be that
predictions of future aversion (‘‘unwanting’’ rather than subjec-
tive ‘‘disliking’’; Berridge, 2004) associated with environmental
circumstances would arise through, and have temporal differ-
ence prediction errors represented by, the activity of selected
5-HT neurons (Schweimer and Ungless, 2010). Then, as circum-
stances change when actions stave off the prospect of punish-
ment, this would lead to an appetitive temporal difference
prediction error (reported by the phasic activity of dopamine
neurons) that would reinforce the avoidance action (Johnson
et al., 2001; Moutoussis et al., 2008; Maia, 2010). Similarly, the
tonic activity of dopamine neurons would include the average
achievement of safety along with the average delivery of reward,
and thus be able to inspire suitably vigorous avoidance actions
(Dayan, 2012b).
Equally, the behavioral inhibition mentioned above as the
Pavlovian response to predictions of punishment would be
mediated by serotonin, which has indeed been implicated in
this function (Gray and McNaughton, 2003; Crockett et al.,
2009, 2012). This would complement the role of dips below
baseline in the activity of dopamine neurons that we also
described previously. Serotonin plays a rich role in various forms
of inhibition, not only for punishments as mentioned above, but
also being involvedwhen animals have to wait for a period before
being allowed to act to get a reward (Fletcher, 1995; Miyazaki
et al., 2011, 2012). This suggests that the interactions among
multiple timescales that we noted above for the dopamine
systemwill be even richer for serotonin; but there is unfortunately
as yet rather little evidence. The serotonin system is notably
more diverse than the dopamine system, with a particularly large
set of receptors with different properties, and only one part may
be involved in aversion.
According to this opponency view, low levels of 5-HT are
associated with impulsivity because of serotonin’s association
with inhibiting behavior.We should note an alternative idea about
serotonin’s role that starts from impulsivity, suggesting that this
comes from a decrease in the importance of distant affective
outcomes compared with proximal ones, i.e., a change in
a discount rate (Doya, 2000). If 5-HT is responsible for setting
this rate, then impulsivity would indeed arise from low levels
of this neuromodulator, with subjects being tempted by small
immediate reward, ignoring large punishments (or delays) that
might subsequently ensue (Cardinal, 2006; Schweighofer et al.,
2008; Mobini et al., 2000). Although it is not a ubiquitous behav-
ioral finding, neural signals associated with discounted values
are indeed affected by 5-HT levels (Tanaka et al., 2007).
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again teach some general lessons about neuromodulation. First
(I), forms of opponency between different neuromodulators are
a common motif, both in the central nervous system and indeed
in the periphery. However (J), this opponency is rarely simple or
symmetric: for instance, although it appears as if the dominant
influence of 5-HT on behaviors associated with dopamine in
practice is inhibitory (Alex and Pehek, 2007; Herve´ et al., 1979;
Fletcher et al., 1999; Grottick et al., 2000), there are many types
of serotonin receptor that have an excitatory net effect on dopa-
mine (Alex and Pehek, 2007; Boureau and Dayan, 2011). In fact,
an excitatory effect would actually be appropriate in some
circumstances if the account about safety signaling is correct,
as dopamine should respond to the prospect of future safety
engendered by the serotonergic report of possible aversion.
Distinctions such as this may provide a route for helping under-
stand part of themultiplicity of serotonin receptors (Cooper et al.,
2002; Hoyer et al., 2002). As mentioned, whether the safety is
achievable depends on the degree of controllability of the envi-
ronment (Maier and Watkins, 2005; Huys and Dayan, 2009);
how controllability is represented is not clear. In terms of the
asymmetry, dopamine appears not to exert nearly such strong
effects on 5-HT as vice-versa. Finally (K), a complex tapestry
of heterogeneity is revealed, particularly within the serotonin
system. We have also noted substructure in the dopamine sys-
tem such as themesocortical dopamine neurons that are excited
rather than inhibited by punishment (Brischoux et al., 2009; Lam-
mel et al., 2011).
Goal-Directed Control, WorkingMemory, and Prefrontal
Cortex
Neuromodulatory representations of utility appear to play a cen-
tral role in habitual control, not the least by controlling learning
directly. Since goal-directed control is based more on predic-
tions of specific outcomes, one might expect different neuromo-
dulatory issues to arise. Indeed, there is direct evidence that
dopamine plays little role in evaluation in the goal-directed
system (Dickinson et al., 2000). Nevertheless, it can still influence
the vigor of the execution of the responses which it mandates
(Palmiter, 2008).
We noted that goal-directed (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002;
Balleine, 2005) or model-based (Daw et al., 2005; Doya, 2002)
control exhibits fuller flexibility in the face of factors such as
changes in motivational state. This requires that the utility of pre-
dicted outcomes can be assessed under the current motiva-
tional state. In turn, this suggests a role for direct and/or indirect
neuromodulatory influences over neural structures such as
gustatory insular cortex or possibly the basolateral nucleus of
the amygdala involved in such evaluation (Balleine, 2005, 2011)
as providing information about that state. However, although
we may be able to predict the values of some outcomes under
expected future motivational states, there appear to be definite
limits to such predictions (Loewenstein and O’Donoghue,
2004), perhaps because of constraints on the subjunctive deter-
mination of neuromodulatory state. This would limit any such
prospective somatic marker (Damasio, 1994).
For goal-directed control to make predictions about the
current (or future) values of future outcomes, it would seemthat these predictions must be made in the moment, or ‘‘on-
line.’’ One obvious way to do this is to enumerate possible future
outcomes explicitly, and sum or average their motivational state-
sensitive utilities. There is some more or less direct evidence for
this (Fermin et al., 2010; Daw et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al.,
2012a; Huys et al., 2012). However, if one views enumeration
as depending on a set of internal actions that control mecha-
nisms such as working memory (Hazy et al., 2006), one might
expect them to be learned using, and influenced by, the
same neuromodulatory machinery as externally directed actions
(Dayan, 2012a). It has been suggested, for instance, that the
Pavlovian mechanisms that lead to approach or withdrawal to
external appetitive and aversive outcomes and predictors might
influence the way that enumeration works. States associated
with reward could be more likely to be enumerated than those
with punishments, under the influence of dopamine (Smith
et al., 2006) and serotonin (Dayan and Huys, 2008; Huys et al.,
2012). If the process of enumeration is influenced by value,
then its predictions will be biased, typically in an optimistic direc-
tion if possible aversive outcomes are suppressed but appetitive
ones boosted.
Much of the mechanics of enumeration is wrapped up with the
adaptive use of working memory. In fact, working memory is
a much more general concern, even for habitual control. This is
because the habit system takes a representation of the current
circumstance and either predicts its value or that of actions
that can be performed, or reports which action is preferred.
In many cases, there is insufficient information in the current
sensory input to determine these quantities, but if selected
aspects of past input can be stored, then it will collectively
suffice (Peshkin et al., 2001; Todd et al., 2009; Kaelbling et al.,
1998; Nakahara et al., 2004). Control over working memory
can have both instrumental and Pavlovian components. From
an instrumental perspective, the basal ganglia could acquire
policies that control the gating of information into working
memory using reinforcement learning (O’Reilly and Frank,
2006). From a Pavlovian perspective, rather as we argued for
enumeration, the phasic release of dopamine associated with
a stimulus that predicts future reward or future safety, could
directly influence the storage of this stimulus in working memory
(Cohen and Servan-Schreiber, 1993; Durstewitz et al., 2000;
O’Reilly et al., 2002), via dopamine’s known effects in prefrontal
cortex (Williams and Goldman-Rakic, 1995).
In total, there is an intricate set of dopaminergically influenced
interactions between prefrontal regions and the striatum (Cools,
2011). It turns out that both phasic and tonic dopamine are
important. For example of the latter, there is a battle for
supremacy of control between goal-directed and habitual
systems, and perhaps contrary to naive expectation, suppress-
ing dopamine increases the influence of habits (de Wit et al.,
2012), and boosting dopamine decreases their influence (Hitch-
cott et al., 2007; Wunderlich et al., 2012b); there are also power-
ful Pavlovian effects (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). These might
arise via dopamine’s hegemony over prefrontal-striatal interac-
tions, possibly through the medium of parts of the dopamine
system that are separable from those involved in functions
such as signaling reward prediction errors. It is certainly a general
notion that (L) neuromodulators can play an important role inNeuron 76, October 4, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 245
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ten, 2009; Cools et al., 2011), and working memory has been
a particular focus for this.
Serotonin also influences the activity of prefrontal neurons in
rather complicated ways (Puig and Gulledge, 2011), potentially
enabling it to influence executive operations such as working
memory. The relationship between this and other possible func-
tions of 5-HT such as predictions about punishment, is not yet
clear. It is known that serotonin in the orbitofrontal cortex is
important for rapid adaption of behavior in paradigms in which
inhibition of (possibly learned) prepotent responses is required
(Roberts, 2011); and this can also be considered to be part of
the regulation of internally directed computation. We discuss
further aspects of this below.
Synthesis
Utility is a poster child for theway that neuromodulators solve the
communication problems raised in the introduction. It also shows
well the scopeand forceof neuromodulation,which is verydeeply
embedded in the very structure of decision making. It is perhaps
the intricacy of the interacting systems of modulation that is
most conspicuous, with many of the general lessons reflecting
combinations of architectural and receptor specificity, and also
the substantial interdependence among the various parts.
Uncertainty
The representation, updating and use of uncertainty, have
become major foci of computational treatments of neural infor-
mation processing (Dayan et al., 2000; Doya et al., 2007; Ma
and Pouget, 2008; Deneve, 2008, Ko¨rding, 2007; Fiser et al.,
2010), with Bayesian analyses dominating. At a coarse time
scale, organisms suffer from ignorance about their environ-
ments, both because of limited opportunities to observe it, and
because it changes in partly unpredictable ways. At a finer time-
scale, organisms have to take noisy and partial observations
from multiple sensory systems to estimate their circumstance
in the world. This in turn influences the evaluation (and thus the
execution) of actions, as we have just discussed. All of these fac-
ets lead to uncertainty, which in turn places severe constraints
on what computations are normatively appropriate.
Strict Bayesians admit no qualitative distinction between
different sorts of uncertainty. However, strict Bayesian computa-
tions are usually radically intractable, and heuristics and approx-
imations are necessary. Based on the evidence described
below, it turns out to be appropriate to make the approximation
of separating issues of uncertainty into learning, which takes
place over a coarse timescale, and inference, which takes place
over two successively finer timescales. We also distinguish
between expected and unexpected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan,
2005b), with the former, often called risk in economics and
neuroeconomics (Glimcher, 2010), quantifying what is known
not to be known within the current conception of the organism’s
circumstance, and the latter capturing what lies outside these
bounds—crudely, radical, unpredicted, changes indicating sub-
stantial failings in this current conception, and sharing some
features with economics’ notion of ambiguity.
The original communication issues that neuromodulators
address also apply to uncertainty. For instance, it is clear that246 Neuron 76, October 4, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.if unexpected uncertainty leads to the need for a dramatic revi-
sion of current computations, then many neural systems will
need to know this fact. Equally, as we will see, expected uncer-
tainty should control plasticity, and there are reasons to seek
a tag which might label the sort of uncertainty involved. Finally,
uncertainty regulates the way that different sources of informa-
tion should be combined; this is a form of systemic adaptation
of structurally fixed connections. There is evidence that the neu-
romodulators acetylcholine and norepinephrine play confined,
but critical roles in both forms of uncertainty; with phasic and
tonic delivery potentially distinguishing between inference and
learning (Bouret and Sara, 2005; Dayan and Yu, 2006).
Uncertainty will first be considered in the context of learning,
and then of inference. Most of the computational models are
Bayesian, or at least approximately Bayesian, in character.
Learning
The only reason to learn is because of ignorance. In (Bayesian)
statistical terms, ignorance is quantified by uncertainty, which
is why uncertainty should control aspects of the nature and
course of learning. Autoassociative memory provides a first
example; then conditioning, which involves richer forms of ex-
pected uncertainty; and finally issues of unexpected uncertainty
induced by change are discussed.
One case of the link between ignorance and learning arises in
the context of auto-associative memory models of the hippo-
campus (Hasselmo, 2006; Hasselmo and Bower, 1993). Here,
the idea is that an input should be assessed to see how familiar
it is. If it is deemed novel, (i.e., the subject is suitably ignorant
of it), it should be stored; if the input is familiar, then recall
processes should remove noise from it and/or recall relevant
context or associated information. Thus, on top of the assess-
ment of familiarity, there are two implementational requirements
for an input deemed to be novel: preventing attempts at recall
from corrupting it and plasticizing appropriate synapses to store
it. Within the particular connection patterns of the hippocampus,
with anatomically and functionally segregated pathways from
the main input structure, the entorhinal cortex, there is evidence
that cholinergic neuromodulation can exert both these effects
(Hasselmo, 2006). The notion is that in area CA3, synapses form-
ing the recurrent connection from other area CA3 pyramidal
cells, and the perforant path input from the entorhinal cortex
have their effective strengths reduced, but are rendered more
labile. The ability (M) of neuromodulators to control the course
of activity by regulating which of a number of gross pathways
determines the activity of neurons is a common scheme. There
are also other potential neuromodulatory routes for this
influence: for instance, ACh helps regulate oscillations ([N], a
critical dynamical effect of neuromodulators in many circum-
stances) that simultaneously affect multiple sub-regions of the
hippocampal formation (Buzsa´ki, 2002). It has been suggested
that different pathways between these regions are dominant
at different phases of theta (Hasselmo et al., 2002), providing
a route for neuromodulatory effects. ACh is also capable of influ-
encing shorter-term storage in working memory (Klink and
Alonso, 1997; Hasselmo, 2006). The (O) effects of neuromodula-
tors on various timescales of plasticity are among their most
influential.
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actually merits long term storage. One way to assess this is to
consider its affective consequences, bearing in mind that they
may only be evident after some time has passed. Given the
evidence adduced above, it should come as no surprise to find
that dopamine is implicated in the later phases of hippocampal
storage (Lisman et al., 2011), although this is a rather different
function from the plasticity engendered by dopaminergically
coded prediction errors that we discussed above as underpin-
ning the learning of appetitive predictions. The extended time-
scale over which such assessments might be relevant could
result in findings such as that patterns that are only incidentally
correlated with the delivery of unexpected reward are also
preferentially stored (Wittmann et al., 2005). Boosted storage
can perhaps be seen as an instance of internal, cognitive,
‘‘approach’’ to a stimulus based on the reward it predicts (Ad-
cock et al., 2006), matching the internal action of storage in
working memory to the externally directed engagement actions
that we mentioned above.
An informationally more complex case for neuromodulatory
influences on plasticity comes in the context of animal condi-
tioning experiments (Gallistel and Gibbon, 2000; Pearce and
Hall, 1980), which have particularly centered on the model-free
Pavlovian case. Psychological notions, such as that the associ-
ability of a stimulus varies with the degree of surprise with which
it is endowed (Pearce and Hall, 1980), can be translated into
computational terms as the relative learning rate of a stimulus
being determined by its predictive uncertainty (Dayan et al.,
2000), and then into neural constructs such as the operation of
cholinergic neuromodulation influenced by regions in the amyg-
dala, hippocampus, anterior cingulate cortex and beyond (Nas-
sar et al., 2010; Behrens et al., 2007; Yu and Dayan, 2005b;
Holland and Gallagher, 1999). Critical for the computational
treatments is that learning depends on the product of the predic-
tion error (putatively mediated by a dopaminergic signal, as dis-
cussed in the previous section on habitual control) and the
learning rate (mediated by ACh)—so it is again an example of in-
terneuromodulatory interactions. How this works biophysically is
not completely clear. Similarly, model-based predictions and
plans are dependent on learning about the structure of the
environment in terms of transitions between circumstances
and outcome contingencies. These should also be regulated
by predictive uncertainty.
Unlike the unfamiliarity of a whole input, uncertainties about
the relationship between conditioned and unconditioned stimuli
or indeed between circumstances and outcomes, are not simple
scalar quantities. They are computationally complex constructs
that depend on rich aspects of present and past circumstances
and the way that these are expected to change over time (Dayan
et al., 2000; Behrens et al., 2007; Nassar et al., 2010). Learning
can be characterized in Bayesian terms using exact or approxi-
mate forms of a Kalman filter. In particular, subjects can be
differentially uncertain about different parts of the relationship,
and this poses a key algorithmic problem for the representation
and manipulation of uncertainty.
Although (P) there is structure in the loops connecting cholin-
ergic nuclei to sensory processing and prefrontal cortices (Za-
borszky, 2002), as indeed with other loops between prefrontalregions and neuromodulatory nuclei (Aston-Jones and Cohen,
2005; Robbins and Arnsten, 2009), there is only rather little
work (Yu and Dayan, 2005a) as to how the relatively general
forms of uncertainty that could be represented even by a wired
neuromodulatory system might interact with the much more
specific uncertainty that could be captured in, say, a cortical
population code (Zemel et al., 1998; Ma et al., 2006). Certainly
(Q), limits to the structural and functional specificity of neuromo-
dulators must be acknowledged, given the relative paucity of
neurons concerned, although it is worth noting that ACh and
5-HT appear to be rather more heterogeneous than DA and
NE. There may be many distinct cholinergic systems, including
the one mentioned above involving tonically active neurons in
the striatum, which might set the stage for plasticity (Aosaki
et al., 1994, 1995). There is (R) evidence for local, presumably
glutamatergic, control of the release of neuromodulators in the
cortex, independent of the spiking activity of the neuromodula-
tory neurons themselves (Marrocco et al., 1987), which could
allow for more specificity in their local effects, but the computa-
tional implications of this in practice are not clear.
These cases of learning fit comfortably into a scheme of ex-
pected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005b), in that the unfamil-
iarity and associability are assessed within a given framework
or, to adopt a term from the cognitive control literature, task
set (Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007). As we mentioned, in
some cases, the whole framework itself may be found to be
inadequate, implying that a new one needs to be inferred (Collins
and Koechlin, 2012). Such dramatic changes to the environment
are considered to be forms of unexpected uncertainty, mea-
sured for instance by forms of model mismatch. They pose a crit-
ical requirement (and opportunity) for acquiring new information
(Yu and Dayan, 2005b), and thus for exploration (Aston-Jones
and Cohen, 2005). They may also be times of significant threat.
When a whole framework proves inadequate, a very wide set
of neural systems might need to be adjusted, and so a neuromo-
dulatory report of the inadequacy seems ideal. Indeed, there is
evidence that tonic activity or levels of norepinephrine do indeed
increase with unpredictable reversals in a simple reaction time
task (Aston-Jones et al., 1991), and that boosting NE can speed
the course of reversal learning (Devauges and Sara, 1990).
Reversals, which are a popular way of inducing change, are nor-
mally signaled when actions or choices that used to be rewarded
become unproductive or less productive; and actions that were
formerly punished or nugatory become worthwhile. Thus, given
their putative roles in providing information about, and inspiring
actions associated with, reward and punishment, one might
expect dopamine and serotonin to be involved directly in the
assessment and realization of reversals. Rapid change is nor-
mally a feature of a model-based or goal-directed system,
however, complexities associated with the competition between
Pavlovian and instrumental control could ensue—the tendency
of the original affective values of the stimuli to cause the cogni-
tive equivalents of approach and withdrawal, would make it
hard for these stimuli to be rejected and embraced as appro-
priate to their new values. Indeed, along with norepinephrine,
the projections of serotonin and dopamine to the striatum and
prefrontal regions have been implicated in forms of behavioral
flexibility such as reversal learning and set shifting (Homberg,Neuron 76, October 4, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 247
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et al., 2004; Cools, 2011), with depletion or destruction leading
to detriments in performance. However, there are interesting
subtleties in this involvement—for instance reversal learning for
reward in marmosets is impaired by either dopamine depletion
in the caudate region of the striatum, or serotonin depletion in
the orbitofrontal cortex, but not vice-versa (Clarke et al., 2011).
Ignorance about the framework provides an opportunity if
there are rewards that could be exploited given suitable learning.
However, it may also pose an escapable threat, if dangers that
can be avoided could lurk. In both cases, ignorance is associ-
ated with expected uncertainty and hints that one might expect
profound links between NE and ACh, as another example of in-
terneuromodulatory interaction and also partial opponency (Yu
and Dayan, 2005b). For the case of opportunities, exploration
is mandated by the (initially unexpected) potential gain, and
thismay be treated as a form of appetitive prediction error known
as an exploration bonus. One, presumably model-free, realiza-
tion of such a bonus is phasic dopaminergic activity (Kakade
and Dayan, 2002). Strictly speaking, the potential gain arises
as a result of the expected uncertainty that follows from the
unexpected change; how dopamine is coupled to ACh and/or
NE in expressing this is not yet clear. The mechanism by which
exploration bonuses arise in model-based calculations is also
unknown.
In terms of potential threats, norepinephrine has long been
linked with anxiety (Bremner et al., 1996a, 1996b). Environments
associated with excessive unexpected uncertainty are highly
stressful, since they lack stable relationships and pose substan-
tial potential problems for safe exploitation. NE helps organize
a massive response to stress, notably in conjunction with
cortisol, a steroid hormone that acts as another neuromodulator
(Wolf, 2008). This involves everything from changing energy
storage and usage, via glucocorticoids (Nieuwenhuizen and Rut-
ters, 2008) (involvement [S] with energy regulation is itself a more
general principle of neuromodulation; Ellison, 1979; Tops et al.,
2009; Montague, 2006), to changing the actual style of informa-
tion processing. For instance, goal-directed or model-based
calculations, which are typically slow, could be suppressed in
favor of habitual or model-free ones, which are typically faster,
though possibly less accurate, especially in the face of the quick
changes associated with unexpected uncertainty. It has been
suggested that suppression arises via functional inhibition
wrought by two particular classes of NE receptor in the prefrontal
cortex (a1 and bb) whose affinities make them sensitive to high
levels of NE; Arnsten, 2011). This combines two previous general
principles—selective affinities of different receptors, and neuro-
modulatory manipulation of gross pathways.
Inference
Information about the circumstance an agent occupies in its
environment has to be combined from multiple sources of noisy
and partial information and integrated over time as it progres-
sively arises. The same turns out to be true for information stored
in working memory, since neural activity has to be communi-
cated to relevant targets progressively, through activity. It also
arises for reading information out of synapses, for which presyn-
aptic activity is necessary to extract their values, for instance248 Neuron 76, October 4, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.using generic, background, activity (Mongillo et al., 2008). These
processes can all fruitfully be seen as involving statistical infer-
ence, based on partial and noisy information, and so are all
controlled or influenced by uncertainty (Fiser et al., 2010; Ma
and Pouget, 2008; Gold and Shadlen, 2002; Ratcliff and Smith,
2004).
In particular, again from a Bayesian viewpoint, uncertainty
determines just how modalities with low signal to noise ratios
should be downweighted against those that are more useful.
Uncertainty also determines how new pieces of information
should be combined with data from the recent past, depending
on factors such as the rate of change in the environment. This
amounts to a form of selective attention. As for the case of explo-
ration bonuses in learning, the impact of uncertainty should be
governed by the utility associated with what can be discovered;
and indeed important links have been found between reward and
at least some forms of sensory attention (Gottlieb and Balan,
2010). We will consider two different timescales of the inferential
effects of uncertainty, one acting across the length of the many
trials that define a single task set; the other acting within the
typically second or subsecond duration of each single trial as
circumstances change.
Just as for conditioning, one might expect that much of the
inferential uncertainty should be highly specific to the circum-
stances of the task, and so outside the realm of relatively coarse
neuromodulatory systems. However, as also for conditioning,
there is evidence for the involvement of both ACh and NE in
controlling critical aspects of inference, at both the timescales
mentioned above. Rather as we saw for the case of learning,
a key phenomenon at the coarser time-scale appears to be
controlling the strength of stimulus-bound information (relayed
in this case by thalamocortical pathways), relative to that of
what one might think of as prior- or model-bound information
associated with the current task set (Hasselmo, 2006; Yu and
Dayan, 2005b; Hasselmo and Sarter, 2011).
Take the paradigm known as the endogenous cue version of
Posner’s attentional task (Posner et al., 1978). In this, subjects
have to respond according to a visual stimulus presented on
one side of a display. Prior to the stimulus, a cue is presented
at the center of the display indicating on which side the stimulus
might appear. The cue can be valid (i.e., pointing to the correct
side) or invalid. The percentage of trials on which the cue is valid
is called its validity. Subjects pay attention to the cue in amanner
that appears to be graded by its validity—the amount by which
they are faster and more accurate on validly than invalidly cued
trials scales with the cue’s validity. In our terms, the validity of
the cue determines its statistical quality. Subjects correctly
set their inferential strategy to reflect this quality, and this
underpins the effect of validity on behavior. There is evidence
in rodents (Phillips et al., 2000) and humans (Bentley et al.,
2004; Thiel and Fink, 2008) that ACh mediates this effect; a
potential substrate is the combined nicotinic and muscarinic
mechanism mentioned above by which thalamocortical path-
ways are boosted and intracortical pathways suppressed by
ACh (Gil et al., 1997; Kimura et al., 1999), although the musca-
rinic effect may be dominant in humans (Thiel and Fink, 2008).
Cholinergic influence over the interactions between bottom-up
and top-down processing are also evident from the effects of
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on boosting or suppressing attentional effects on firing rates of
neurons in area V1 of macaques while they perform a visually
demanding task (Herrero et al., 2008). Also, stimulating the basal
forebrain (where one population of ACh neurons lives) reduces
the correlation between visual neurons reporting on natural
scenes via a muscarinic mechanism (Goard and Dan, 2009).
Looking over a range of shorter timescales, cholinergic neuro-
modulation has also been implicated in aiding signal detection
in rodents in tasks soliciting forms of sustained attention
(McGaughy and Sarter, 1995; Parikh et al., 2007). For instance,
Parikh et al. (2007) used amperometry to measure changes in
the concentration of ACh in medial prefrontal (mPFC) cortex
over various timescales in a Pavlovian task. Here, a cue was
provided on each trial, predicting a reward after a delay of
around 2 s or 6 s; the mark of attentional engagement was
a cue-evoked shift in behavior, which then led to hastened
reward acquisition. Cue detection in the task was impaired by
removing cholinergic inputs from the mPFC, suggesting that
performance was sensitive to ACh. For normal animals, ACh
was substantially released over a short timescale on trials
on which animals successfully detected the cue (but not
when they failed); successful detection was associated with a
decreasing rather than an increasing trend in ACh over the
20 s preceding the cue; and higher tonic levels of ACh concen-
tration (measured over minutes) were tied to larger phasic ACh
signals associated with the cue, and faster (Pavlovian) actions.
The various interactions with the medium term (20 s) and
longer term (minutes) averages of the ACh concentration remind
us of complexities surrounding a commonly reported finding for
neuromodulators, (T) namely a inverted U-shaped curve of effi-
cacy (Yerkes and Dodson, 1908). An example finding is that
drugs that boost a neuromodulator such as dopamine have
a beneficial effect for subjects whose baseline levels are low,
but a harmful effect for subjects for whom these levels are high
(Kimberg et al., 1997; Cools et al., 2011; Floresco and Magyar,
2006). Alternatively, increasing the tonic activity of a neuromodu-
lator might have the same dual effects, as suggested for norepi-
nephrine (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; Berridge, 2008; Arns-
ten, 2011). It is certainly the case that if a neuromodulator
represents a quantity such as expected uncertainty, then, for
any environment, there will be an optimal level (together with
optimal temporal modulation around this level) that leads to the
most effective inference and learning: levels that are larger or
smaller than this would produce computational inefficiencies.
Subjects whose baseline levels are closer to this optimum value,
perhaps because of their genetic endowments, past experience,
or the interaction between the two, would perform best; subjects
with too little or too much will be affected in obvious ways by
boosting or suppressing the signal.
At the fine, subsecond, timescale of presentation of the cues,
the phasic release of ACh is related to the expectation of a
change in circumstance associated with the upcoming reward
(which is when the phasic signal peaks; Parikh et al., 2007).
This would arise as the subject’s expectation about the possible
change in circumstance rises following detection of the cue.
Along these lines, (Sarter et al., 2009) measured ACh transients
in a more complex task in which subjects had to detect andreport a short signal whose delivery was designed to be highly
unpredictable, or else report that the signal was not present.
Given a cholinergic lesion, subjects were again more likely to
miss the signal. In this task, significant ACh release in the
mPFC on a trial only occurred if the subjects had both detected
a signal on that trial and reported a non-signal on the previous
trial. If one thinks of the signal circumstance in one trial as estab-
lishing a task set that lasts across subsequent trials (with a much
shorter inter-trial interval than Parikh et al., 2007), there would
therefore be little expected uncertainty when (detected) signal
follows (detected) signal, and so ACh release would not be ex-
pected (Sarter et al., 2009).
This ACh transient can be seen as a phasic version of the ex-
pected uncertainty tonic signal suggested for ACh in the context
of learning. Conversely, the phasic version of theNE signal would
be to mark an unexpected defeat of the current circumstance.
The inferential implication of such unexpected uncertainty or
model failure is that existing inferences are made unsound, so,
for instance, any ongoing integration of sensory information
over time should be cancelled and reset, and that the subject
should enjoy new, expected, uncertainty about its circumstance.
The phasic activity of norepinephrine neurons in the locus coeru-
leus during signal processing tasks (Aston-Jones et al., 1994,
1997; Clayton et al., 2004; Rajkowski et al., 2004; Bouret and
Sara, 2004), primarily in monkeys, has been interpreted as being
consistent with this notion (Yu and Dayan, 2005b; Bouret and
Sara, 2005). Along the same lines, NE plays a role in temporal
alerting, for instance in the Posner paradigm when information
is provided about when the target arrives rather than which
side it arrives upon (Witte and Marrocco, 1997), and in another
task called the stop-signal reaction time task (Bari et al., 2011)
that is a popular way of assessing temporal aspects of the defeat
of ongoing expectations.
The tasks used to examine phasic ACh (Parikh et al., 2007) and
NE (Aston-Jones et al., 1994; Clayton et al., 2004) have some key
points of similarity—notably relatively long and unpredictable
delays before important events occur. One difference is that
the tasks involving NE typically have rare targets (perhaps
boosting unexpectedness), whereas those involving ACh have
common targets. It would be interesting to record phasic NE
and ACh signals simultaneously (perhaps indirectly in human
subjects via pupil dilation; Gilzenrat et al., 2010)—one might
expect that NE would be released to the cue, as a temporal alert,
but that it is the phasic rise in ACh that prepares the ground for
the (now expected) reward to be delivered.
Particularly for the case of DA (Servan-Schreiber et al., 1990)
and NE (Brown et al., 2005), there has been work on how an
effect of these neuromodulators on the input-output gain of
neurons might influence overall network dynamics that imple-
ment inferences such as decision making. One of the simplest
decision making networks involves effective mutual inhibition
between two competing groups of neurons (Usher and McClel-
land, 2001), with action initiation occurring when the activity of
one group reaches a threshold (Bogacz et al., 2006; Gold and
Shadlen, 2002; Lo and Wang, 2006). Boosting the gain of the
neurons in such a network can make it unstable and therefore
allow whichever of the two groups currently has the greater
activity to reach the threshold promptly, with barely any furtherNeuron 76, October 4, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 249
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Brown et al. (2005) considered the problem of decision making
architectures in which one network determines the release of
NE, which then modulates another network that is more directly
responsible for initiating the decision. They pointed out what is
a general issue for phasic activity (U), namely that the time it
takes for the neuromodulator to be delivered to its site of action
(norepinephrine fibers are not myelinated) appears to be at the
margins of the period inwhich there is a chance to have a suitable
effect on the on-going computation.
Synthesis
Unlike utility, which seems a natural candidate for neuromodula-
tory realizations, uncertainty does not, because of the exquisite
selectivity that subjects should exhibit in their sensitivity to
uncertainty. Nevertheless, substantial evidence suggests the
involvement particularly of acetylcholine and norepinephrine in
representing and acting on uncertainty, and we have also seen
that there are rich links between these neuromodulators and
also with dopamine. Many of the general lessons that we learnt
for utility have been reiterated, and some new ones learned,
particularly concerning the overall architecture of influences.
Discussion
This review has considered general properties of neuromodula-
tors through the lens of effects on decision making. The latter is
a critical competence, and we have seen the rich involvement
of very many aspects of neuromodulation. Concomitantly, (V)
problems or manipulations of neuromodulatory systems are
tied to debilitating neurological and psychiatric diseases, such
as addiction and Parkinson’s disease, and they are also major
therapeutic targets, as in schizophrenia, depression, Alzheimer’s
disease, and beyond (computational issues are discussed in
Maia and Frank, 2011; Huys et al., 2011; Montague et al., 2012).
Further (W), individual (e.g., genetic) differences in factors such
as the properties of particular receptor types, or the efficacy of
transporters controlling the longevity of neuromodulators
following release, have been associated with differences in deci-
sion making behavior, such as the propensity to explore or to
learn frompositiveor negative feedback (Franket al., 2007, 2009).
We have seen many instances of the three communications
problems reviewed in the introduction. However, these problems
are rather generic, whereas the twenty five lessons discussed
throughout the review have shown some of the peculiarities of
the ways that neuromodulators help solve them. In Table 1,
they are grouped into two broad categories, addressing issues
of how neuromodulatory systems are organized and the conse-
quences they have for information processing. For the first, we
have seen common motifs such as heterogeneity in space (i.e.,
different receptor types with different affinities, some localized
on different systems) and heterogeneity in time (with phasic
and various scales of tonic release). There is a number of forms
of control, including self-regulation by autoreceptors, complex
forms of interneuromodulator interaction, and even the possi-
bility of local glutamatergic control over release. Other, systemic,
control mechanisms also exist, such as loops between prefrontal
areas and neuromodulatory nuclei which exert mutual influence
upon each other. These, and indeed other functions of the neuro-250 Neuron 76, October 4, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.modulators, may be complicated (X) by corelease of other neuro-
transmitters and other neuromodulators through the same axons
(Stuber et al., 2010; Lavin et al., 2005).
Given the focus on decision making, the key neuromodulators
were dopamine, serotonin, acetylcholine, and norepinephrine,
which represent information about reward, punishments, and
expected and unexpected uncertainty. However, these cate-
gories are, of course, crude, contentious, and incomplete.
Even in the context of our discussion, issues such as the propen-
sity of phasic dopamine activity to report a temporally sophisti-
cated prediction error associated with the delivery of future
reward (Sutton, 1988; Barto, 1995; Montague et al., 1996) illus-
trates some of the complexities: this signal resembles a predic-
tion under certain circumstances rather than just a simple error;
further, given a safety signaling interpretation of avoidance
learning, it also represents predictions of the attainment of
safety, which is not a conventional reward; further, the cumula-
tive prediction error signal can report a measure of the long-
run rate of reward, which is a signal with its own computational
significance. Indeed, we have in general suggested ways of
linking phasic and tonic interpretations of neuromodulatory
activity, although theymay act as partly independent information
channels.
The second category of lessons in Table 1 concerns the
effects of neuromodulators on neural processing. The two
most important systemic effects are controlling plasticity
(perhaps via controlling activity, under a Hebbian view) and
controlling whole pathways, such as dopamine’s influence
over direct and indirect pathways through the striatum or over
gated working memory, and acetylcholine’s influence on thala-
mocortical versus intracortical interactions. In conjunction with
suitable heterogeneity, manipulating pathways as a whole is
perhaps of particular importance as a mechanism, influencing
both external actions such as Pavlovian behaviors and instru-
mental vigor, but also internal actions, controlling the deploy-
ment of working memory or the expansion of a tree of possible
future circumstances and actions that are being evaluated.
There are also dynamical effects, such as changing the gain of
competitive, decision making circuits, along with a substantial
impact on central pattern generators that is best understood
in invertebrate preparations (Harris-Warrick, 2011; Marder and
Thirumalai, 2002).
For the future, one of the most immediately pressing issues
concerns resolving the historical problems in recording from
neuromodulatory neurons, measuring their local concentrations
at target zones, and selectively manipulating their activity or that
of particular receptor types. For instance, nuclei such as the
ventral tegmental area or the dorsal raphe, which contain dopa-
mine and serotonin neurons, also contain other neuron classes,
and extracellular measures of facets such as spike shape are
imperfect discriminators (Ungless et al., 2004). Many of these
issues are on the cusp of being comprehensively addressed in
animal studies through the use of new tools, including new and
improved recording methods, molecular biology, and optoge-
netics. For instance, genetically encoded channelrhodopsin
can be used to provide a functional tag for extracellular record-
ings (Cohen et al., 2012). Unfortunately, these advances have yet
to provide help for work on humans. Although the new vogue for
Neuron
Reviewpsychosurgery is providing opportunities for recording (Zaghloul
et al., 2009) and cyclic voltammetry (Kishida et al., 2011), the
most important workhorse is functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), perhaps combined with pharmacology (Honey
and Bullmore, 2004). However, not only do we know very little
about the coupling between activity and the blood oxygenation
level-dependent (BOLD) signal that is measured in fMRI in areas
such as the striatum that are the main targets of key neuromodu-
lators, but also (Y) these neuromodulators might be able to affect
local blood flow directly themselves (Peppiatt et al., 2006),
further muddying the interpretation.
From a computational perspective, there is much work to do
to understand the overall network and systems effects of the
changes that we know different neuromodulators lead to in
individual elements in those circuits. This may also help us
understand aspects of various sorts of heterogeneity—e.g.,
what is achieved by the subtle differences within families of
receptors, and also the rich intertwining of the neuromodulators.
It may even help us unravel issues to do with pharmacological
manipulation of the neuromodulators—for instance, helping
explain the well-known fact that selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors have a rapid effect on serotonin transport but take
weeks to have a stable effect on mood (Blier, 2003), perhaps
partly because of effects on autoreceptors and negative feed-
back control mechanisms, and partly because any quick effect
on (aversive) emotional processing has to be embedded through
learning to affect dispositions (Harmer et al., 2009).
However, the most compelling computational issue is the one
that has appeared in various places in this review, namely the
relationship between specificity and generality and cortical
versus neuromodulatory contributions to representation and
processing. For utility, this issue centers on the interactions
between model-free and model-based systems, with the former
being substantially based on neuromodulators such as dopa-
mine and serotonin, whereas the latter depends on cortical pro-
cessing (albeit itself subject to modulation associated with
specific stimulus values). For uncertainty, the question is how
representations of uncertainty associated with cortical popula-
tion codes, with their exquisite stimulus discrimination, interact
with those associated with neuromodulators, with their apparent
coarseness.
In sum, I have discussed how neuromodulators solve key
problems associated with having a structurally languorous but
massively distributed information processing system such as
a brain. Neuromodulators both broadcast and narrowcast key
information about the current character of the organism and its
environment, and exert dramatic effects on processing by
changing the dynamical properties of neurons, and the strengths
and adaptability of selected of their synapses in both selected
and dissipated targets.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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